Mechanisms meet Structural Explanation by Felline, Laura
The final version of this paper will appear in Synthese. 
Please quote only from the final version. 
Mechanisms meet Structural Explanation
Laura Felline*
Abstract. This paper investigates the relationship between Structural Explanation and the New
Mechanistic account of explanation. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to argue that some
phenomena in the domain of fundamental physics, although mechanically brute, are structurally
explained; and secondly, by elaborating on the contrast between SE and ME, to better clarify some
features  of  SE.  Finally,  this  paper  will  argue  that,  notwithstanding their  apparently  antithetical
character, SE and ME can be reconciled within a unified account of general scientific explanation.
Keywords. Structural  Explanation,  Mechanistic  Explanation,  Epistemic  Conception  of
Explanation.
Introduction
One of the major strengths of the New Mechanistic philosophy (Glennan 1996, Machamer et al.
2000) is the virtually ubiquitous application of mechanistic reasoning in scientific practice, which
also  makes  Mechanistic  Explanation  (ME)  plausibly  the  most  successful  account  of  scientific
explanation currently available. However, there are some domains  where mechanistic reasoning,
and ME with it, drastically loses its predominance in the scientific enterprise. This is often the case
in the philosophy of  fundamental  physics.  On the  other  hand, those phenomena which are not
explained through a ME are not necessarily unexplainable brute facts of nature: mechanically brute
(as I will call them) phenomena might be nonetheless explained by science. One partial aim of this
paper is to give flesh to this claim by showing that some mechanically brute phenomena in the
domain of fundamental physics are structurally explained.
Since its origin in R.I.G. Hughes' work (Hughes 1989b, p.175), a central role in the definition of
Structural Explanation (SE) was played by the claim that SE is independent of any assumption
about what types of entities and what types of processes lie within the theory’s domain. On the one
hand, this feature  received an essentially anti-metaphysical connotation; on the other, it was also
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used as the key to understand the non-causal character of SE. Some central features of SE have
therefore been shaped on the elaboration of such a characterization. The second partial aim of this
paper is  to  reconsider  Hughes'  original characterization of the  non-causal  character of SE as a
contrast with a merely metaphysical kind of causal explanation, and to re-qualify it as a contrast
with ME.
The paper's structure is as follows. In §1, I introduce the issue of the limited applicability of ME
in fundamental physical theories. Probably the mechanistic philosopher who has devoted the most
attention to such problem is Stuart Glennan (1996, 2002, 2010, and more recently Kuhlman and
Glennan 2014),  so  his  framing  of  the  issue  deserves  a  special  attention.  Independent  of  more
general considerations, in §2  I provide two illustrating examples of  phenomena that are typically
seen as successfully explained by our best fundamental physical theories and yet, I will argue, are
mechanically brute. More specifically, such phenomena are structurally explained. In §3, I elaborate
on the contraposition between SE and ME and investigate the consequences of such contraposition
for SE. It could be argued that the two accounts of explanation refer to antithetical general views of
scientific explanation and cannot therefore be both true.  To counter such a conclusion,  in  §4 I
underline the common features of SE and ME and show that they might be assimilated by the same
theory of explanation. More exactly, ME and SE can be both assimilated by an epistemic, model-
based account of explanation that work by providing information about patterns of counterfactual
dependences. 
As I have said, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between SE and ME. I will
not in general be concerned by the question as to whether SE is also mutually exclusive to other
kinds of causal explanation (of causal relevance or of other kinds of causal production), nor whether
fundamental physics provides causal explanations different from ME of some mechanistically brute
phenomena.  There  is  a  recent  growing  literature  about  non-causal  and  so-called  mathematical
explanations  in  natural  sciences  (e.g.  Batterman  and  Rice  (2014),  Reutlinger  (2012),  Pincock
(2013), Lange (2013), Skow (2013)). The issues  at the centre of this debate are very important and
intersect in some points with the literature on SE. However, in this paper I will only occasionally
touch on such arguments. I have left until another  occasion the study of how SE inserts in these
important topics.
1 Mechanisms and the explanation of fundamental phenomena
Mechanically explaining a phenomenon P requires describing, in a more or less idealized way,
the mechanisms responsible for P (Glennan 2002, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007,
Illari and Williamson 2010). The novelty of the New Mechanistic philosophy, with respect to the
traditional mechanical philosophy of science, lies in its definition of mechanisms as systems. There
is actually no consensus yet on the correct definition of mechanism, and the details of this debate
are irrelevant to the scope of this paper. Here it is sufficient to cite two of the most quoted:
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior
by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts
can  be  characterized  by  direct,  invariant,  change-relating  generalizations.
(Glennan 2000, p. S344)
 And:
Mechanisms  are  entities  and  activities  organized  such  that  they  are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions. (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3)
A common feature of all different characterizations of mechanisms as systems is that they are
hierarchical, in the sense that each part of a mechanism is a mechanism in itself and its behavior is
therefore  explainable  by  the  description  of  its  components  and  the  interaction  between  them
(Glennan 2011, Machamer et al. 2000).
This  process  of  regress,  though,  is  not  infinite.  At  one  point,  one  reaches  a  level  where
mechanistic  reasoning  and  ME  have  no  place.  This  follows,  under  an  atomist  stance,
straightforwardly by assumption. If the layers of physical composition have a bottom level, i.e., the
level of the most elementary components of the world – then, by assumption, the behaviour of such
elements cannot be explained in terms of the interaction between their component parts (Glennan
1996, 2002, 2010). Anyway, regardless of whether or not one adopts an atomist stance, mechanistic
reasoning – and ME with it – drastically loses its ubiquitous role at the level of current fundamental
physics. The question of exactly where ME is or not applicable obviously depends on the specific
details of the mechanistic account chosen. For instance, (Kuhlman and Glennan 2014) argued that
mechanistic reasoning is generally not applicable to quantum phenomena because the concept of
entities as parts of mechanisms might be problematic in (at least) three ways. According to them, in
fact, at least three characteristic features of quantum systems (i.e. indeterminateness of properties,
indeterminateness of position, entanglement) are incompatible with mechanistic reasoning.
First of all, while in ME the behaviour of a mechanism depends on the interaction of its parts in
virtue of their dynamical properties, the vast majority of properties of a quantum object are virtually
always  indeterminate.  MEs  that  depend on  such  dynamical  properties  are  therefore  in  general
forbidden in quantum phenomena. 
Figure 1. (Redrawn from Glennan (2011)) The two parts  a and  b of  a mechanism are mechanisms themselves. The
arrows represent the interaction between parts  a and  b of a mechanism, and the  dashed lines represent constitutive
relations.  a and  b are themselves complex systems, mechanisms whose behavior is explainable by the behavior and
interactions of their constituents (as the way they interact, which can also involve the mediation of further entities (i 1
i2)).
Secondly,  among  such  properties,  one  of  the  most  important  in  ME,  due  to  its  role  in  the
organization  between  a  mechanism's  component  parts,  is  the  spatial  location  of  such  parts.  In
general, though, quantum objects are not describable as localized objects. As a consequence, this
feature  of  ME  is  also  generally  problematic.  Third,  quantum  objects  are  virtually  always  in
entangled states. When a composed system is in an entangled state, the latter state is not captured by
the  states  of  the  component  systems  plus  their  spatio-temporal  organization.  Moreover,  in  an
entangled state, each individual component system does not have a determinate quantum state, only
the composed system does. The behavior of a system composed of two entangled subsystems is
therefore mechanically unexplainable for two reasons: on the one hand, in a ME a complex system
must  be  decomposable  in  the  sum of  its  parts;  on  the  other,  a  ME requires  the  possibility  of
individuating parts with individual states.
Obviously,  it  could  be  argued  that  ME  does  not  necessarily  require  determinateness  of
properties, especially of location, and factorizability – in the next section I will illustrate with two
case  studies  that,  independent  of  the  specific  features  one  attaches  to  ME,  there  are  some
explanations of fundamental physical phenomena that are not ME.
In Glennan's older works the conclusion of the analysis of the case of mechanical inexplicability
of the fundamental laws of physics was that such laws are “brute nomological facts of our universe”
(2002,  S348, but  see al1996).1 However,  phenomena that are  not  mechanistically  brute  are  not
necessarily unexplainable brute facts of our universe, unless one assumes that the only genuine
scientific explanation is ME. In the pluralistic view defended in this paper, a phenomenon can be
mechanically brute but still explained by science. There are indeed many cases of mechanically
fundamental phenomena that are typically conceived as explained by science.2 In particular, as I am
going to argue in the next section, some of them are structurally explained.
2 Two examples of SE
The structural account of explanation was originally outlined by R.I.G Hughes (1989a, b) and
successively developed by  Clifton (2001), Bokulich (2009), Felline (2010) and Dorato and Felline
(2011). At a later point (§4), I will articulate more precisely some of its features. For the moment it
is sufficient  to  know  that  SE  is  a  model-based  explanation  (Hughes  (1997))  that  exploits  the
mathematical models displayed by the theory and works by showing how (the formal representative
of) the explanandum counterfactually depends on other mathematical elements or features of the
model (Bokulich (2009)).
The geometrical explanations of relativistic effects in the Special Theory of Relativity provide
clear-cut and well-known examples of phenomena that are structurally explained. To illustrate in
more detail how such explanations work, let us take the example of length contraction. This is the
phenomenon for  which the  length of  a  rod,  when measured  by an  observer  in  relative  inertial
motion, is shorter than its proper length.
The  most  convenient  representation  of  phenomena  in  Special  Relativity  makes  use  of
Minkowski  diagrams. So, first  of all,  the fundamental  quantity in  Minkowski  space-time is  the
(pseudo) distance between two events, namely the space-time interval I. For simplicity, let's put one
of such events at the origin O and the other in the event A (x, t) of the reference frame S. Then the
space-time interval OA is given by the formula
I2 = x2 – t2. (1)
This  formula for  the  'distance'  between  two  points  represents  the  fundamental  difference
between  Minkowski  space-time  and  Galilean  space-time  and  is  originated  by  the  different
geometries  they adopt.  While  in  the  Galilean  (Euclidian)  space-time  the  distance  between two
points (events) OA follows the Pythagorean theorem:
distance2 = x2 + y2, (2)
in Minkowskian space-time, such a theorem is not valid and is replaced by its corresponding 
1 Kuhlmann and Glennan (2014) though have recently adopted a more explicitly pluralistic position.
2 Of course I am not denying here the existence of basic unexplained facts at the bottom of our scientific explanations. 
That some fundamental phenomena are structurally explained does not mean that all of them are.
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equation for relativistic right triangles:
distance2 = x2 – y2, (3)
from which the formula for the space-time interval follows.
Let  us  now  take  a  Minkowksi  diagram  of  a  rod  as  a  4-dimensional  object  living  in  a
Minkowskian space-time, at rest with respect to the frame of reference S (Fig 2a). The proper length
of a rod is the spatial distance between two events located at the two ends of the rod and which are
simultaneous in the rod's reference frame. Again, in our diagram we have put one of these events at
the origin O and labeled the other event 'A'. Let's assume that the interval OA is equal to 1.
Now, we must find the locus of events that lie at the same unit distance from O. In Galilean
space-time, such locus is a sphere with centre  O and radius 1 (a circle in our two-dimensional
representation,  which  is  indeed the  geometrical  figure  individuated  by eq.  2).  In  Minkowskian
geometry,  this  locus  is  identified  by  a  hyperbola  (which  is  indeed  also  the  geometrical  figure
individuated by eq. 3) - the so-called 'invariant', or 'calibrating', hyperbola.
The invariant hyperbola of figure 2b represents the locus of events that lie at space-time distance
1 from O. In order to find the event which lies at a proper spatial distance 1 from O in the frame of
reference S',  it  is thus sufficient to draw the space axis x'3 and take its intersection A' with the
invariant hyperbola. 
Consider now that the space-time interval between two events is equal to their spatial distance in
the reference frame where the events are simultaneous.4 This implies that the spatial distance OA in
3 The slope of S' depends on its velocity relative to S.
4 This is a straightforward consequence of eq. 3.
S is the same as the spatial distance OA' in S'. Finally, the length of the rod in S' is given by OP' (as
figure 2b shows) which is shorter than OA'. So the length of the rod in S' is shorter than its (proper)
length in S.
The explanation just laid out is not a ME, since here the dynamical features of the specific rod in
question are irrelevant and the relativistic effects are not understood as dynamically or causally
produced. It instead depends on the fundamental geometrical features of four-dimensional objects in
Minkowski  space-time.  A geometrical,  mathematical,  representation  of  reality  (as  provided  by
Minkowski models) is thus explanatory, because it highlights the features of the world on which the
explanandum depends, and it neglects irrelevant details (i.e. the specific microphysical details of the
rod, but also whether space-time is a substance or a relation) (see Dorato and Felline 2010 and
Janssen 2009).
At this point, it may be argued that the fact that an explanation abstracts from some typically
mechanical details does not imply that such an explanation is not a ME. The argument would go
like this: ME explains by providing a description of the underlying mechanism, but it might abstract
on dynamical or constitutive details, if these are not relevant in the explanation. Machamer et al.
(2000, § 5.3), for instance, illustrate how mechanism schemata (truncated abstract descriptions of a
type  of  mechanism)  provide  explanations  that  abstract  from  details  about  the  entities  or  the
activities of the mechanism. The independence of microphysical or dynamical details is therefore
not sufficient for an explanation not being a ME.
There are two arguments that, in response to this objection, can be put forward in order to show
that this (and, we shall see, the next) example should not be taken as a very abstract ME.
First of all, a general consideration. The mechanistic account of explanation is liberal enough to
cover an impressive amount of phenomena, mostly due to the cited feature of allowing abstraction
in the mechanism schema used in the explanation. However, if abstraction taken to its limits leads
eventually  to  classifying as  mechanistic  an  explanation where  no microphysical  and dynamical
detail of the systems underlying the occurrence of the explanandum is relevant, it is legitimate to
wonder what is therefore left here of a ME.
This is exactly the case of the geometric explanation of length contraction. The vast majority of
the  New  Mechanists  acknowledge a  pluralist  view  of  explanation  where  non-mechanistic
explanation exists in science. And there is no easy answer to the question 'where does the limit
between  a  mechanistic  an  a  non-mechanistic  explanation  lie',  so  there  is  of  course  space  for
controversy in the evaluation of specific case studies. However, arguing that an explanation which
is completely independent of the details about entities and activities underlying a phenomenon can
still be covered by the mechanistic account leads to an account so liberal that it becomes void or at
least looses its distinctive features and the core of its success.5 As a reaction to the temptation of
taking the liberalism allowed by the New Mechanistic Philosophy to its limits, it should be kept in
mind what is the essence of a ME: describing the mechanism underlying the occurrence of the
explanandum, where a mechanism is taken as its parts (entities in Machamer et al. 2000) and its
interactions (activities in Machamer et al.  2000). This core of the New Mechanistic philosophy
carries  much  of  the  ontological,  heuristic  and  epistemic  value  that  has  made  of  mechanistic
reasoning, and of ME, one of the most fertile explanations in science and in the philosophy of
science (Machamer et al. 2000) and is completely lost in a version so weak that covers also the
above example of explanation.
A second,  more  pointed,  answer  discusses  the  generality,  rather  than  the  abstraction,  of  a
mechanistic interpretation of such fundamental explanations. As it can make use of a very abstract
model of mechanism, ME can also make use of models of very general mechanisms; however,
even in this case, stretching the concept of mechanistic model to the limit leads to a drastic loss of
significance and utility of the concept of mechanism as complex system. This is danger is clear in
the case study just illustrated. In the nowadays 'orthodox' (Brown, 2005) interpretation of Special
Relativity, relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, in fact, are understood
as kinematical phenomena, i.e. they are “nothing but a specific instance of some generic feature of the
world, in the case of [length-contraction] of default spatio-temporal behavior.” (Janssen 2009, §1.2) If
interpreted  as  a  very  general  model  of  a  mechanism,  Minkowski  models  of  spacetime  would
become the schema of a dubious 'universal mechanism'. A universal mechanism of such type would
underly therefore all default spatio-temporal behaviour, of every complex system in nature – it is
difficult to imagine what kind of mechanism such universal mechanism might be.
The two general points just raised are valid for different examples of non-causal explanations
(e.g.  Lange (2013), Pincock (2007)) – however there is a different answer that makes use of a
specific feature of SE. Such feature will be more thoroughly explored in the next section, but we
can anticipate a part of that discussion here. What the geometrical explanations of SR show is that
relativistic effects like length contraction are not causally produced: they are instead what you get,
so  to  speak,  when  'nothing  happens'.  But  the  mechanistic  account  is  a  productive  account  of
causation and of causal explanation.6 In the words of Carl Craver: “Mechanisms [...] are not mere
static  or  spatial  patterns  of  relations,  but  rather  patterns  of  allowance,  generation,  prevention,
production,  and  stimulation.  There  are  no  mechanisms  without  active  organization,  and  no
mechanistic explanation is complete or correct if  it  does not capture correctly the mechanism’s
5 Depending on the specific definition of mechanism adopted, and on the role of counterfactual dependencies in such 
definition, ME might in this case collapse to a counterfactual theory of explanation.
6 For the distinction between causal production and causal relevance, see (Hall, 2004, Sober 1985)
active  organization.”  (2007,  p.136,  my  italics).7 Again,  the  dynamical  details  of  the  processes
involved in the production of the explanandum might be irrelevant and therefore absent  in  the
explanation, but if a phenomenon is mechanically explained (and explainable), production must be
involved in the occurrence of the explanandum. It might therefore be said that SE is the explanation
of  non-mechanically  explainable  phenomena  –  and  therefore,  a  fortiori,  non  mechanically
explained.
As another example of SE, this time from Quantum Theory, Dorato and Felline (2011) illustrate
the explanation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Relation8 between position (x) and momentum (p).
The  traditional  quasi-classical  way  to  explain  this  phenomenon  involves  the  example  of  a
measurement of the position of an electron with a microscope. The explanation appeals to the fact
that, in a process of measurement a beam of light had to be sent to the electron. The collision with
the scattering photons disturbs the electron, and changes its momentum. This explanation is now
considered,  at  best,  an  intuitively  straightforward  way  of  introducing  the  relations  in  a  quasi-
classical picture, far from being a realistic description of the processes underlying the Uncertainty
Relations.9 Indeed, when they were first noticed by Heisenberg, these relations were considered a
phenomenon that required an explanation, but such and explanation (in the mechanistic form that
was initially expected) was never provided. Yet the position/momentum Uncertainty Relation is not
in general regarded as unexplained in Quantum Theory, but as a perfectly understandable part of
Quantum Theory.
The reason is  that  the Uncertainty  Relation  between position  and momentum is  structurally
explained  within  Quantum  Theory.  Such  relation  is  explained  by  showing  how,  within  the
mathematical model representing quantum states (the Hilbert space of square-summable functions),
and as a generalization of de Broglie's equation (p  =  ђ/λ  =  ђ/k) to non-plane waves, the formal
representative Ψ(px, py, pz) of the momentum of the electron is the Fourier transform of the function
Ψ(x, y, z), which formally represents the coordinates specifying the position of the particle. Finally,
it is a consequence of the features of the Fourier transform that, as the interval in which one of the
two functions differs significantly from zero becomes more narrow, the interval in which its Fourier
transform differs from zero increases proportionally.
To explain the position/momentum Uncertainty Relation, we do not need to appeal to the
details of the constitution of the quantum systems involved, nor to interactions (implied, in this
case, in the measurement interaction) between them: such details underlying the occurrence of the
explanandum are irrelevant in the modern explanation of the relation.  In the latter, instead,  the
7 See also i.e. Glennan 2011, and, for a general overview Russo and Illari 2014 Ch. 12.
8 Following Dorato and Felline (2010), here we are relying on the standard formulation of the Uncertainty Principle. 
It is to be said that the validity of such a formulation is still object of some debate (Uffink 1990); however, such 
disputes are out of the scope of this paper.
9 See Uffink (1990).
Uncertainty Relation between position and momentum is explained as a direct consequence of the
formal,  mathematical  properties  of  Hilbert  space.  The result  of  such an explanation  is  that  the
explanandum,  once  again,  is  not  understood  as  the  product  of  a  causal  process,  but  as  the
instantiation of a fundamental feature of the world.
This being said, there is another point that strongly suggests that the modern understanding of
the Uncertainty Relations is a SE, in the sense given above. An essential step towards our current
understanding of Heisenberg’s Relations was taken some years after Heisenberg’s first derivation,
with  the  more  general  derivation  provided  in  1929  by  Robertson  (1929).  Essentially,  such  a
derivation allowed a deeper understanding of Heisenberg’s Relations via a different SE.
Here, Δx · Δp ≥ ђ /2 is shown to be a specific case of a more general Principle
Δα·Δβ ≥ ½ |(Ψ, [A, B] Ψ)| , (1)
where  A and  B are  any two non-commuting operators  (spin in  two different  directions,  for
example) and [A,  B] is their commutator. So, for every state  Ψ and every pair of non-commuting
observables α and β and corresponding operators A and B, the product of the uncertainties is greater
than the expression on the right hand side. Accordingly, the new (and now standard) SE of the
Uncertainty Relation between position and momentum is actually a general explanation valid for
any pair of non-commuting observable.
Here it  becomes even clearer  how the insight  typical  of the  current  understanding of the
Uncertainty Relations is independent of any mechanical model of the phenomenon. The explanation
is  both  too  abstract  and too  general  to  be  included in  an  informative  and fruitful  mechanistic
account of explanation. First of all, the explanation is independent of any dynamical or constitutive
details of the systems involved. Moreover, the fact that this new standard understanding is not the
result of reflection on the mechanisms underlying the relations is obvious when one considers that
this  understanding is  common to all  pairs  of  non-commutable observables.  There is  in  fact  no
apparent sense in which the processes underlying the loss of a determinate position for a particle
with definite momentum can be said to be the same as the one leading to the loss of x-spin for a
particle  with determinate  z-spin.  Such a  relation is  instead  explained as  part  and parcel  of  the
algebraic structure of observables in Quantum Theory.
3 Structural explanation vs mechanistic explanation
In Hughes'  work (1989a), the contrast  between SE and causal  explanation is  grounded on a
metaphysical  conception  of  causal  explanation.  In  recent  years,  however,  the  theory  of  causal
explanation has progressed a good deal, thanks in part to the new mechanistic approach, which
aspires to a non-metaphysical account of causal explanation. In this section, I want to investigate
the significance of the non-causal character of SE by elaborating on the contraposition between SE
and ME.
First  some history.  The  idea  of  SE was  originally  put  forward  in  order  to  account  for  the
explanatory power of Quantum Theory, where the metaphysical foundations of the theory are the
subject of a time-honored debate.  According to Hughes,  in fact,  the task of accounting for the
explanatory  power  of  Quantum  Theory  was  made  harder  than  it  should  have  been  by  the
widespread idea (among philosophers) that scientific explanation necessarily relies on assumptions
about the categorial framework of a theory - i.e. the set of fundamental metaphysical assumptions
about what types of entities and what types of processes lie within a theory’s domain. This view is
explicitly advocated for instance by Duhem (1954), for whom scientific explanations are attempts to
account for phenomenal laws in terms of prior metaphysical assumptions.
This, Hughes continues, is exactly the problem with causal explanation, which he pictures as
necessarily metaphysical in nature and therefore inapplicable to quantum phenomena, because no
successful  interpretation  has  yet  been found to  provide  a  grounding categorial  framework (see
Hughes (1989a) p. 206-207).  SE, on the other hand, is independent of any assumption about the
kind of entities and processes underlying the occurrence of the explanandum. This makes it a non-
metaphysical and non-causal scientific explanation and therefore able to account for the explanatory
power of Quantum Theory, independent of the solution of the interpretation problem.
However,  as  illustrated  by  the  case  studies  in  §2,   rather  than  only  as  independent  of
metaphysical commitments, SE is in general independent of any dynamical and constitutive detail
concerning the processes and entities underlying the explanandum phenomenon. This suggests that
the  non-causal  character  of  SE would  be  more  accurately  (and,  I  shall  argue,  more  fruitfully)
interpreted in contrast with the New Mechanistic account of causal explanation.
Think  about  the  paradigmatic  case  of  Special  Relativity  and  the  explanation  of  length-
contraction illustrated in the previous section. There,  we have seen that SE is, as Hughes says,
independent  of  the  categorial  framework  of  Special  Relativity,  i.e.  of  any  assumption  about
whether space-time is a substance or a relation between material bodies. But the SE of length-
contraction is  also independent  of any assumption about  the mechanical  details  of the  systems
underlying  the  phenomena  to  be  explained,  i.e.  the  dynamics  and the  physical  composition  of
bodies undergoing length-contraction.
If we characterize SE's non-causality as independence from mechanistic details, my version of
SE shares that feature with Batterman's (2002) asymptotic explanation - although what Batterman
calls  'physical'  I  call  'mechanical'  details.  However,  a  basic  difference  distinguishes  SE  from
Batterman's mathematical explanations in higher-level sciences: SE is not only an explanation of a
regular behaviour, but also of individual phenomena. Batterman's asymptotic explanation works by
abstracting  from  mechanical  details  of  the  specific  instances  of  the  production  of  singular
phenomena, in such a way that a universal behaviour combining different phenomena is identified.
The individual instances of the explanandum, though, are always explainable through a detailed,
causal account that shows how the explanandum was produced. This is not so in SE. For one, as we
have seen in the case of Quantum Theory, there just might not exist properly 'mechanical' details of
the individual  case to  abstract  from, because  individual  phenomena themselves do not  concern
complex,  but  rather  mechanically  elementary  systems.  But  even  in  those  cases  where  the
explanandum concerns the behaviour of complex systems (this is, for instance, the case of length
contraction) the individual instances of the explanandum are not explainable with a mechanistic
account.  So, for example, I explain why this specific moving rod contracts, by appealing to the
geometrical properties of the models displayed in the explanation illustrated above. Such properties
represent not only high-level properties of an extremely abstract and universal model, but also the
properties  (e.g.  spatio-temporal  properties)  of  an  individual  system.  There  is  no  alternative
constructive10 ME of why this specific rod 'shrinks'.
This point is, again, strictly entangled with what has been said in the discussion of the case
studies in §2. There, we have seen that it is a widely shared assumption that in Special Relativity
length-contraction  is  to  be  understood  as  a  kinematical  effect.  Under  this  assumption,  and
appropriating once again Micheal Janssen's words, “[i]t is a mistake to keep looking for further
explanation  of  a  phenomenon  once  that  phenomenon  has  convincingly  been  shown  to  be
kinematical.” There is nothing that a ME could add to the understanding of phenomena like length
contraction because there is nothing that might be added about such universal phenomena by the
study  of  less  general  mechanisms.  At  the  same  time,  no  mechanical  model  can  render  more
intelligible the fact that there is no spin state in which one could predict with certainty the result of
both a z-spin and an x-spin measurement, once we acknowledge the characterization provided by
Robertson's SE of the Uncertainty Relations as a universal phenomenon.
So, as we have already anticipated in the previous section, SE is not only a non-mechanistic
explanation, but also an explanation that (differing with  Batterman's asymptotic explanation) 11 rules
out the possibility of a ME, even for individual instances of the explanandum.
What has been said so far also has consequences with respect to the characterizations that SE
provides of the explained phenomena. ME provides information  about the explanandum’s causal
history  (such  as  an  unknown  force  that  shrinks  rods),  and  this  shows  that  and  also  how  the
explanandum was the result of a productive process. SE, on the other hand, provides information
about elements of reality  that forces us to reassess the conceptual framework within which we
10 For the distinction between principle and constructive explanation, see Felline (2009)
11 It is my opinion that the same can be said of the other most notable examples in the literature about non-causal 
explanation (i.e. Pincock 2013, Lange 2013), but the discussion of these cases would bring us off topic, so I will not 
argue this point.
model the world. Such new information might even concern features that we previously considered
to be universal (e.g. the commutativity of the algebra of observables), kinematical, or even a priori
(e.g. the new Minkowskian space-time geometry which replaced the Euclidean one).12 So, length
contraction is explained by showing that it  is not the result of a process undergone by material
bodies, but rather by the fact that it is an instantiation of part of the geometric structure of space-
time, the latter being not Euclidean as previously expected, but Minkowskian (Jannssen 2009).
Two more observations are in order before we move to the next section.
In the context of Quantum Theory, Hughes' characterization of non-causal as non-metaphysical
suggests  that  QT  cannot  provide  causal  explanations,  unless  one  subscribes  to  a  specific
interpretation of the formalism. However, some kind of causal explanation as ME is possible in
Quantum Theory. Of course, as already said, what exactly one should count as a ME depends on the
specific characterization that is given to ME. It has been already illustrated (§1), for instance, how
Kuhlman and Glennan (2014)  argue  that  some characteristic  features  of  quantum systems (i.e.
indeterminateness of properties, indeterminateness of position, entanglement) are incompatible with
mechanistic reasoning. So, according to such a view, those quantum phenomena that depend on
such  features  of  quantum systems  are  mechanistically  unexplainable.  This,  however,  does  not
necessarily  imply  the  impossibility  of  MSs  of  any  quantum  phenomena.  There  are  quantum
phenomena, in fact, whose occurrence is independent of such features, and rather depends on other
mechanical  properties  whose  application  is  unproblematic  in  the  quantum context.  This  is,  for
instance,  the  case  of  phenomena  concerning  a  large  number  of  quantum  systems,  where  the
explanation is probabilistic and the indeterminateness of properties becomes irrelevant. In other
cases, the localization of systems is not relevant for the causal organization of the mechanism, or
when a determinate behaviour only depends on the Hamiltonians of the subsystems, that adds up
normally, even if the systems are entangled. Notice that, according to Hughes' characterization of
SE's  non-causality,  such  kind  of  explanation  is  non-causal,  since  it  is  independent  of  any
metaphysical commitment.
The  second  observation  concerns  the  other  feature  traditionally  attached  to  SE,  as  the
explanation  of  fundamental,  ground-level  theories.  Non-causality  and fundamentality  in  SE are
usually suggested to go hand in hand (see Hughes 1989b, Bokulich 2008), yet the claim that current
fundamental physical theories do not provide causal explanations is a highly controversial one. The
basis  for  such confusion  is  the  fact  that  the  notion  of  fundamentality  does  not  have  a  unique
interpretation – some consider only the ultimate general theory, the Theory of Everything, to be
12 I don't want to defend here the claim that space-time geometry is a feature of our representation of reality as opposed 
to reality itself. I just want to leave open the possibility of various interpretations (e.g. conventionalist) of space-time 
geometry, and stress that given the view of models and representation to which we make reference, the geometry of 
space-time can play an explanatory role, whatever interpretation one providesfor it.
fundamental,  others consider fundamental  those theories whose domain is  the smallest  scale  of
length, and others still take them as concerning the ultimate constituents of the world.
Such  confusion  is  dissolved  once  we  qualify  the  non-causality  of  SE  as  non-mechanistic
explanation, and SE as an explanation of mechanistically fundamental phenomena. First of all, one
trivially  has  the  sought-after  link  between  causality  and  fundamentality  in  SE:  non-causal
phenomena are,  in  this  sense,  trivially,  fundamental  phenomena.  In the context  of an atomistic
philosophy, among them are included the behaviors of the most elementary constituents of physical
reality  and  the  behaviors  of  complex  systems  that  are  understood  as  instantiations of  a
mechanistically fundamental structure of the world (e.g. length contraction). The fundamentality to
which  SE applies  is  not  necessarily  related to  what  is  'ultimate',  or  the  'smallest',  or  the 'most
elementary' or belonging to the domain of the theory of everything.
Finally, as suggested in  §1, talking in terms of mechanistically fundamental phenomena might
also  be  consistent  with  a  non-atomist  view  of  the  world,  where  no  bottom,  most  elementary
constituent  of  nature  exists,  but  yet,  starting  from  a  certain  level  of  fundamentality,  some
phenomena are not analyzable in terms of mechanistic notions (Kuhlman and Glennan 2014). SE,
therefore, are not necessarily the 'ultimate' explanations, in terms of the brute facts of our universe.
 In sum: Hughes links the non-causal character of SE to its independence of assumptions about
the  categorial  framework  of  the  theory  of  reference.  Instead  of  giving  a  purely  metaphysical
connotation to such features, I argued that it would be more fruitful to see the non-causality of SE
as independence of mechanisms. In this section, I have elaborated on the analysis of the case studies
provided in  §2 and argued that not only is SE not a ME, but it is also the explanation of non-
mechanistically explainable phenomena.
Also, I have shown how the contrast between SE and ME leads to a different applicability of SE
and  causal  explanation  in  QT (with  respect  to  the  one  defined  by  Hughes)  and  of  a  clearer
specification of the sense in which SE is the explanation of fundamental phenomena.
4 Mechanisms meet Structural Explanation
In the previous section, I characterized SE negatively through its opposition to ME: SE is a
non-mechanistic explanation that applies to non-mechanistically explainable phenomena. Given that
the apparently deep divergences between the two accounts, one might be naturally led to doubt that
the SE and ME might even in principle be reunited within a single general account of scientific
explanation. With the aim of overcoming such doubts, in this section I provide a more positive
characterization of the relationship between SE and ME, by elaborating on some general features of
scientific explanation that encompass both SE and ME. I  argue that both explanations are  best
understood as epistemic, model-based explanations that work by fitting the explanandum into a
pattern of counterfactual dependencies.
i) Models. Both SE and ME might be understood as epistemic, model-based explanations –
i.e., according to Salmon's famous classification of philosophical accounts of scientific explanation,
both  SE  and  ME  can  be  framed  within  the  epistemic  view  of  scientific  explanation.  This
classification is quite natural for SE, as it is traditionally characterized as a model-based explanation
that exploits the mathematical models displayed by the theory (see Hughes (1989a) and Bokulich
(2009). The assimilation to the epistemic view, though, might instead sound controversial for ME,
given  that,  following  Salmon's  account,  the  latter  is  traditionally  assimilated  to  the  ontic
conception.13 However,  such  classification  is  not  obvious  and  there  is  nothing  that  forbids  an
epistemic version of ME. In fact, some of the most prominent accounts of ME, are proposed as
epistemic accounts of explanation (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005)). Moreover, those accounts
that are put forward as ontic accounts, also provide details on the requirements for a mechanistic
model to be explanatory, that might as well be used as a basis of a model-based account of ME (e.g.
Machamer et al. (2000) and Glennan (2005, 2011).
This  being  said, it  might  even  be  argued  that  the  epistemic  view  is  actually  the  best
framework for ME. This is the position, for instance, of Wright (2012), who argues that the ontic
view is untenable, given that the term 'explanation' essentially denotes an epistemic activity. 
ii) Counterfactual dependence. The challenge remains to show that SE and ME might share
the same foundations of explanatory relevance. The DN model is not of much help here. It has
already been argued at length that, in general, subsuming a phenomenon under laws of nature does
not necessarily provide understanding. This is true also of the explananda in the examples of § 2. In
fact,  while  it  is  possible  to  subsume  these  explananda  under  more  general  laws  of  nature,  a
reformulation  of  the  above  scientific  explanations  in  such  terms  leads  to  a  critical  loss  of
explanatory power (see Felline 2009). The unificationist model is also of no use because there is as
yet no precise shared definition of what counts as unification, with which it is possible to analyse
the explanations we have in mind (see for instance Woodward 2011, § 5). 
A different  and more  up to  date  approach focuses  instead on counterfactual  dependence.
Bokulich (2009) for instance puts forward a general account of model-based scientific explanation
where  explaining  implies  exhibiting  a  pattern  of  counterfactual  dependence.  Bokulich's  model
explanations can encompass different kinds of scientific explanations, among them both SE and
ME. With respect to ME, this view is especially fit in those mechanistic accounts that give a central
role to counterfactual dependence in the definition of a mechanism (Craver 2007, but also Glennan
2010). Besides ME, however, in the model explanation account, the same kind of counterfactual
13 One of the clearest endorsements of such view is put forward in Craver (2007), and McKay Illari and Williamson 
(2010).
knowledge  is  provided by SE at  a  fundamental  level.  According to  Bokulich,  in  this  case  the
explanandum is shown to be counterfactually dependent on the limitations that the mathematical
structure of the theory imposes over  what  sorts  of objects,  properties,  states,  or behaviours are
admissible within the framework of that theory.
With a more neutral characterization, in both cases one explains with a model by investigating
how, when you change some features of the model, the explanandum changes in response.
We can therefore find the way to frame the difference between SE and ME, within a common
framework  of  explanatory  relevance:  both  explanations  work  by  providing  a  pattern  of
counterfactual dependencies, but they differ in the 'origin' of such counterfactual dependence. In
ME the  explanandum phenomenon counterfactually  depends on  a  mechanical  properties  of  the
underlying  mechanism,  via  the  activities  undergone  by  the  entities  within  the  mechanism
(alternatively: the interactions undergone by the mechanism's component parts) For instance, the
speed of my car is explained as counterfactually depending on variables that represent mechanical
properties  of  the  motor  inside  the  car.  In  SE,  the  explanandum  counterfactually  depends  on
variables that represent the mathematical features of the explanans. For instance, length-contraction
is explained as depending on the correspondent of the Pythagorean theorem for relativistic squared
triangles. Or Heisenberg's relations are explained by showing how they counterfactually depend on
the non-commutativity of the algebra of quantum observables,  against  the commutativity of the
algebra of classical observables.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that some fundamental physical phenomena, that are mechanically
unexplainable, are structurally explained. Moreover, I have argued that SE's non-causality is better
understood as in opposition to the New Mechanistic model for causal explanation.
In order to highlight the common origin in the explanatory power of SE and ME, I focused on
a core feature of scientific explanation, i.e. that it  provides counterfactual knowledge. I guess a
skeptic on the explanatory role of mathematics in natural sciences might still counter that that SE is
nothing but an abstract reformulation of the explanandum, rather than an explanation of it. To such
kind of objection it can be argued that the structural account of explanation is explanatory according
to a general model-based theory of explanation grounded on counterfactual dependencies. That said,
I also acknowledge that there might be more to the explanatory relevance of structural explanations,
than the shared explanatory basis  of counterfactual  information.  If  this  is  true,  i.e.  if  scientific
explanatory relevance requires more than counterfactual information, I do not necessarily expect
that these additional elements are unique for all explanations.
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